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Eerie Prostheses and Kinky Strap-Ons:  
Mori’s uncanny valley and ableist ideology 
 
Abstract 
 
In his paper ‘The Uncanny Valley’ (1970), Masahiro Mori advises designers to 
avoid high degrees of human likeness in prosthetic body parts in order not to 
evoke uncanniness. Building on a discussion of the difference in the 
commonly experienced uncanniness of ‘realistic’ looking prosthetic hands and 
strap-on dildos, this paper argues that Mori’s hypothesis and his approach to 
design are based on an essentialist concept of the human body, which is 
complicit in the persistence of ableist body ideologies. Reading recent 
empirical research on the uncanny valley in the context of Jentsch’s and 
Freud’s writing, it is suggested that the design of body-related artefacts should 
promote, rather than avoid, repetitious uncanny experiences. Such a project 
aims to diminish uncanniness through ‘force of habit’, thus facilitating the 
acceptance of a broader variety of bodies as equal. 
 
Introduction 
 
Masahiro Mori’s hypothesis of the ‘uncanny valley’ has been used extensively 
as an analytical and conceptual tool in new media art, animation and games 
design (e.g. Beer and Guez 2013; Schneider, Wang and Yang 2007; Tronstad 
2008). In ‘The Uncanny Valley’ (2005 [1970]), Mori reflects on the difference 
in the way industrial robots, developed with a focus on functionality, and 
humanoid robots, which are designed with an interest in human likeness, are 
experienced. Whereas industrial robots bear little resemblance to human 
bodies and usually do not evoke a sense of ‘familiarity’, toy robots with limbs 
and facial traits that resemble the composition of a human body are more 
frequently experienced as familiar. However, Mori argues that the experience 
of familiarity of robots and prosthetic limbs does not increase linearly 
according to their degree of human likeness. If likeness is further increased 
beyond the example of the humanoid toy robot, as is the case in certain 
cosmetic artificial limbs and humanoid robots such as Repliee Q1 and Q21, 
the robot or prosthesis is experienced as uncanny2. Mori suggests that 
whereas prosthetic limbs built with a focus on functionality evoke a sense of 
‘sympathy’, a prosthetic hand that shows great likeness in appearance with a 
‘real’ hand is uncanny. The uncanny valley then, is apparent in a graphic 
representation of different degrees of human likeness in robotics and 
prosthetics design, set out against the degree of familiarity they are expected 
to evoke (figure 1). Applying this graph as a guideline in technology design, 
Mori concludes that designers should avoid the uncanny valley by means of 
developing technologies with a ‘safe familiarity by a nonhumanlike design’ 
(2005 [1970], n.p.). 
 
In this paper, I will suggest that Mori’s hypothesis and his call to avoid 
uncanniness in design practice are based on an essentialist concept of a 
‘whole’ human body, which is complicit in the persistence of ableist body 
ideologies3. I will consider the commonly experienced heightened degree of 
uncanniness of a realistic looking prosthetic hand in comparison to another 
realistic looking prosthesis, which is not usually experienced as uncanny: the 
strap-on dildo. Contextualizing this difference in recent empirical research into 
the uncanny valley, I will then suggest that the supposed eeriness of a 
realistic looking prosthetic hand should be attributed to its perception in 
relation to a body that is considered ‘incomplete’, rather than – as Mori’s 
hypothesis suggests – its close likeness to a ‘real’ human hand. The paper 
will conclude with a discussion of Ernst Jentsch’s and Sigmund Freud’s 
writing on the uncanny as a dynamic phenomenon, which may diminish 
through repetitious experience or associative working through. Building on 
this, I will propose that the design of body-related artefacts should promote, 
rather than avoid, repetitious uncanny experiences, in order to facilitate an 
acceptance of ‘ability diversity’ (Wolbring 2008: 257) in our experience of 
bodies that do not conform to a narrow band of species-typical normative 
physical characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mori’s uncanny valley (Mori 2005 [1970]). 
 
Robotic prosthetics have been explored by artists and cyberneticists such as 
Stelarc and Kevin Warwick. Stelarc has developed a robotic hand (Third 
Hand, 1976-1981; figure 2) and work that extends the artist’s body with larger 
robotic structures (Exoskeleton, 1998; Movatar, 2000). Similarly, Kevin 
Warwick’s Project Cyborg 1.0 (1998) involved an artificial hand controlled 
through signals emitted by implanted microchips. Indeed, when we compare 
these industrial-looking artificial limbs with the 1970s realistic-looking 
prosthetic hands Mori refers to (figure 3), the uncanny valley hypothesis 
appears to be sustained: Stelarc’s and Warwick’s prostheses evoke a certain 
familiarity in that their shape and movement show a degree of resemblance to 
those of human limbs, yet they do not have the eerie quality that we may 
attribute to the prosthetic hand or other artificial limbs that show greater visual 
likeness to human body parts. 
  
Figure 2: Stelarc – Third Hand (1976-1981). Photo by Simon Hunter. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Latex prosthetic hand, 1970s. Smithsonian National Museum of 
American History 
(http://invention.smithsonian.org/centerpieces/inventingourselves/pop-ups/01-
03.htm [accessed 2/11/2013]) © The Smithsonian Institute 
 
There are other kinds of prosthetic body parts where Mori’s model does not 
seem to apply so neatly though. An example of a prosthetic device that hardly 
ever evokes a sense of uncanniness is the strap-on dildo (figure 4). 
Regardless of how detailed the manufacturers simulate veins and skin 
pigmentation, this artefact seems far less likely to be associated with the 
uncanny than the prosthetic hands Mori alludes to. The quite ‘realistic’ looking 
example here more probably affords a sensation of kinkiness than it is 
considered eerie4. Does this suggest that the uncanny valley hypothesis is 
false or inaccurate? 
 
 
Figure 4: Strap-on dildo 
  
In a recent study, psychologists Burleigh, Schoenherr, and Lacroix (2013) 
presented experimental subjects with a range of computer-generated 
representations of human faces. They performed two experiments. In the first 
experiment, subjects were presented with a continuum of facial 
representations with increased geometric realism and prototypicality (i.e. 
adherence of the face’s shape to normative expectations of human 
appearance). Participants were asked to rate the degree of human likeness, 
as well as the degree of ‘eeriness’ 5  they experienced for each of the 
generated facial representations. The outcome of this experiment showed that 
human likeness and perceived degrees of eeriness are linearly correlated; the 
more human like the image, the less eerie (or more ‘familiar’) it was 
experienced. In other words, the experiment suggested that Mori’s uncanny 
valley hypothesis does not hold true. 
 
In order to explain how previous empirical research outcomes by other 
psychologists could have been interpreted in support of the hypothesis 
(MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2011; Saygin et al., 2011; 
Seyama & Nagayama, 2007) Burleigh et al. conducted a second experiment. 
For this experiment two continua of human likeness were generated. The first 
was limited to what the researchers describe as the ‘ontological category of 
humans’ (2013: 761), whilst atypical human features were introduced along 
the continuum (‘unnatural’ skin colour and an enlarged eye). The second 
continuum merged human and non-human categories and featured hybrids of 
human faces with those of a goat-like creature. Responses to the first 
continuum were comparable to those in the first experiment, i.e. perceived 
degrees of human-likeness and eeriness were linearly correlated. However, 
the continuum introducing non-human features showed a heightened level of 
eeriness and lower level of pleasantness around the mid-point of human 
likeness. Based on these findings, Burleigh et al. suggest that the uncanny 
valley is not directly related to the degree of human likeness. Instead, the 
valley seems to occur where stimuli located at a mid-point between two 
ontological categories elicit a negative affect due to ambiguous and conflicting 
interpretations; uncanniness results from a ‘category conflict’ where the 
subject is unsure whether what is perceived is human or non-human. 
 
Now, let’s return to the strap-on dildo and the realistic-looking prosthetic hand. 
Why is the prosthetic hand more likely to evoke a sense of uncanniness than 
the realistic looking dildo? Following Burleigh et al., the hand may be more 
likely to evoke a ‘category conflict’ because the beholder is unsure whether 
the hand is an actual human body part, or a non-human substitute for a 
missing ‘real’ hand. The strap-on does not pose this difficulty; it is usually 
perceived as an addition to an ‘able’, whole body. Regardless of the degree of 
human likeness of its appearance, there is no doubt about the non-
humanness (or ‘unnaturalness’) of the artefact, and accordingly it is unlikely to 
evoke an uncanny experience. 
 
As I mentioned above, in the conclusion of his paper, Mori calls for designers 
to steer away from high degrees of human likeness in their artefacts, in order 
to avoid the uncanny. Pointing to their finding that the uncanny valley is not a 
result of a higher human likeness of features, but of ontological category 
conflicts, Burleigh et al. recommend that there is no reason for digital 
designers not to aim for high degrees of human likeness in terms of graphical 
texture resolution and polygon count of computer-generated models. 
However, they recommend avoidance of the combination of human and non-
human features. This may sound like a sensible suggestion if we accept that 
categories of the uncanny are stable and a confrontation with something we 
experience as uncanny is per definition negative. However, on paying closer 
attention to the concept of the uncanny this position is less self-evident: if we 
consider Jentsch’s and Freud’s original accounts of the concept it becomes 
apparent that the nature of the uncanny should not necessarily be conceived 
in ontological terms. 
 
In what is generally regarded as the first publication on the concept of the 
uncanny, psychologist Ernst Jentsch (1997 [1906]) argues that experiences of 
the uncanny are triggered by an uncertainty concerning the animatedness of 
an object. Referring to a human skeleton, he suggests that uncanny objects 
evoke ‘thoughts of latent animatedness’ (1997: 15). Thus, in a somewhat 
similar vein to Mori, Jentsch attributes the experience of the uncanny to the 
closeness in appearance of the skeleton to aspects of a living human body; 
the skeleton looks as if it could be animate. In response to Jentsch, Freud 
(1919) suggests that instead of a ‘latent animatedness’, the uncanny is 
evoked by the revival of either ‘primitive beliefs’ or ‘infantile complexes’. The 
former concerns experiences where rejected and/or repressed beliefs about 
the animatedness of the environment appear to be confirmed by a certain 
experience. For example, the occurrence of nocturnal noises in a derelict 
building may suggest to a subject that ghosts exist, despite her or his 
conscious rejection of this notion. The latter involves experiences where the 
subject is confronted with infantile desires that have been repressed since 
childhood. As an example, Freud mentions the uncanniness of things that 
remind us of our inner ‘compulsion to repeat’ (1919: 237) – a tendency which 
threatens to overrule the pleasure principle – such as the encounter of a 
‘double’, or the repetition of the same character-traits or events in seemingly 
unrelated persons or situations. 
 
A detailed discussion of the differences between Freud’s and Jentsch’s 
positions on the nature of the uncanny is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
what is of interest here are the perspectives of both psychoanalysts on the 
dependency of the uncanny on a degree of coherence and consistency in the 
subject’s experience. Freud suggests that uncanny experiences, particularly 
those related to a revival of primitive beliefs, are not necessarily triggered by 
an actual encounter with an object or event, but may also occur in fiction, on 
the condition that ‘the setting is one of material reality’ (1919: 250). When we 
read a work of fiction that establishes a world that we believe to be ‘real’ or 
‘realistic’, occurrences that suggest the existence of super- or outer-natural 
phenomena within that world are likely to be experienced as uncanny. Thus, 
instead of resulting from a certain relation to a stable ontological realm, the 
uncanny should be seen in the context of a symbolic system, which needs to 
be believed true or realistic by the subject.  
 
Jentsch also refers to the instability of the uncanny and its dependency on the 
subject’s belief with a certain coherence of experience. Drawing from his 
experiences with patients he states that: 
 
Apart from the force of habit, the associative working through of 
the awkward affect that mostly occurs in [a repetitious uncanny 
experience] plays a very significant part in the affect's 
disappearance. Whether this working through is factual or not is 
of no great importance, as long as its final result is accepted by 
the individual (1997: 15; emphasis added). 
 
Thus, Jentsch’s perspective also suggests that the uncanny should be seen in 
relation to a symbolic system. Through a repetitious associative process the 
phenomenon in question can be incorporated into this structure and will lose 
its uncanniness as a consequence. 
 
If the uncanny is an affect that is dependent on a subject’s belief in a certain 
constitution of the ‘real’ world, and may disappear either through habit or an 
associative working through, the ‘category conflict’ Burleigh et al. refer to 
should not necessarily be considered of ontological nature. Indeed, when 
approached from the perspective of theories in posthumanism (e.g. Hayles 
1999; Wolfe 2010), the categorization of what is ‘human’ is neither universal 
nor stable.  
 
The difference between the prosthetic hand and the strap-on dildo is that the 
former is perceived as a substitute for something believed to be missing from 
an ‘incomplete’ human body, whilst the latter is more likely to be regarded as 
a kinky addition to an ‘able’ body that is ‘whole’. In other words, the 
uncanniness of the realistic looking prosthetic hand lies in its function as an 
indexical signifier for bodies that are considered incomplete. If we adopt a 
psychoanalytical perspective, we could argue that the hand functions in terms 
of Freud’s second category of uncanniness, in that it evokes an infantile 
complex: the prosthetic hand can be regarded as a referent for the corps 
morcelé, a fear of the fragmented body which has been repressed since the 
mirror stage (Lacan 1949). However, what I am interested in here is not so 
much the relevance of psychoanalytical theorizations of the mirror stage as 
the humanist concept of the ‘whole’ human body, which arguably underpins 
the notion of this supposed fear of a ‘body in pieces’. Cary Wolfe has rightly 
argued that despite humanism’s intention to promote the treatment of people 
with disabilities with equality and respect, humanism reproduces ‘the very kind 
of normative subjectivity – a specific concept of the human – that grounds 
discrimination against […] the disabled in the first place’ (2010: xvii). The fact 
that an essentialist, unchangeable concept of the human body is at the very 
centre of humanist thought means that bodies that do not correspond to this 
model are per definition classified as different and unequal. In this context, the 
uncanniness of the prosthetic hand can be seen as a manifestation of an 
essentialist and ableist idea of ‘the’ human body, which is narrowly defined in 
terms of a stable set of characteristics. 
 
Following Jentsch and in accordance with posthumanist critiques of 
essentialist concepts of the human body, a repetitious experience of – or 
conscious engagement with – the uncanniness of the prosthetic hand would 
facilitate the integration of the prosthetic hand in the symbolic system of our 
concept of the human body. It would no longer act as a signifier for a lack of 
‘normal’ humanness in the context of a fixed idea of a ‘whole’ body with two 
hands. Thus, just like a body without a strap-on is not commonly perceived as 
incomplete or disabled (pace dubious psychoanalytic suggestions of female 
bodies ‘lacking’ a penis), the ‘un-uncannying’ of the prosthetic hand could play 
a role in the acceptance of a body with one or no hands as a normal human 
body. 
 
Mori’s and Burleigh et al.’s advice to designers to avoid the uncanny in their 
work may be sensible from the perspective of product sales optimization in 
the current market economy. However, as I have argued in this paper, this 
approach eventually reinforces the narrow set of cultural beliefs of what 
constitutes a ‘whole’, ‘healthy’ human body, which is central to the 
discrimination of bodies that fall outside this constructed category of the 
normal and the natural. Instead, wouldn’t it be preferable for artists and 
designers to aim for the uncanny, and stubbornly forge ‘category conflicts’ 
where commonplace ideas of ‘the’ human body are merged with cultural 
categories of the abnormal, unnatural and unhealthy? Let us produce so 
many uncanny artefacts that the ‘force of habit’ will teach us to experience an 
infinite variety of bodies as equal! 
                                                
1 Repliee Q1 and Repliee Q2 are so called Actroids, sophisticated humanoid 
robots that have been developed at Osaka University, Japan, in collaboration 
with Kokoro Company Ltd. from 2002. 
2 Mori does not define the term ‘uncanny’ in his paper. Throughout the 
present paper, I use the term in accordance with Oxford Dictionary of 
                                                                                                                                      
English’s (2010) broad definition as ‘strange or mysterious, especially in an 
unsettling way’. 
3 Ableism is the cultural practice of labelling ‘real or perceived deviations from 
or lack of “essential” abilities’ of a body as ‘a diminished state of being’ 
(Wolbring 2008: 253). 
4 Needless to say, the strap-on dildo is a culturally loaded artefact that 
touches on interesting debates on the performativity of gender and sexuality. 
However, these aspects are not of key relevance for the purposes of the 
present paper. Here, I focus on the characteristics of this artefact in terms of 
the perception of its connection to the user’s body. 
5 Burleigh et al. use the more colloquial term ‘eerie’ to describe the uncanny 
in their experimental questions. 
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